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PROBABLE CAUSE, REASONABLENESS, AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR ARCILA

DavidE. Steinberg*
I. INTRODUCTION

A. ProfessorArcila's Topic
With his article, In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood
Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause,' Professor Fabio
Arcila, Jr. has contributed a valuable work that significantly enhances
our understanding of Fourth Amendment history. In the relatively
few articles that go beyond a superficial glance at Fourth Amendment
history, authors tend to focus on broad conclusions, attempting to
derive some general theory of the original understanding of the
Amendment. This big picture focus is certainly true of my own work
on Fourth Amendment history, such as my article published in this
Journal.
Professor Arcila prudently focuses on a more narrow question:
What did the probable cause requirement mean in the Framing era?
Even more specifically, how did early American judges view their role
in the warrant application process? As Professor Arcila puts it, did
'Judges act as vigilant sentries, aggressively inquiring into the merits
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of a probable cause assertion?0 Or did judges act in a "merely ministerial manner, not engaging in gate-keeping at all?",4 These are important questions, and Professor Arcila's analysis of these questions is
both extremely thorough and extremely useful. Ultimately, I disagree with many of the conclusions that Professor Arcila draws. But
my disagreements should in no way detract from the high quality of
Professor Arcila's account.
B. ProfessorArcila's Arguments
Professor Arcila raises at least four arguments regarding Fourth
Amendment history, and the uses of this history by modern lawyers,
judges, and scholars. First, Professor Arcila asserts that the probable
cause standard was not uniform in early America, but differed depending on who was issuing the warrant. This argument is wellsupported, consistent with other sources, and extremely convincing.
Second, Professor Arcila argues that, although the evidence is
mixed, "one cannot say that judges consistently implemented a universal sentryship duty during the Framers' era,, 5 but instead tended
to provide limited review of warrant applications. While recognizing
the conflicting evidence, I do not believe that Professor Arcila has
demonstrated that a ministerial review of warrant applications predominated over a more demanding probable cause review of warrant
applications.
Third, Professor Arcila suggests that if Framing-era magistrates did
not limit law enforcement powers through aggressive review of warrant applications, then this acquiescence supports a Fourth Amendment interpretation that emphasizes reasonableness, as opposed to a
warrant preference rule. This argument is based on a modern false
premise-the Fourth Amendment must either incorporate a warrant
preference rule or a reasonableness requirement. As I argue in this
Article, this is a false choice. The Framers did not endorse either a
warrant preference rule or a reasonableness requirement. Instead,
the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment for the narrow purpose
of requiring a specific warrant based on probable cause prior to any
search of a house.
Last, but certainly not least, Professor Arcila expresses reservations
about the value of history in interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
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Professor Arcila writes that the requirement of probable cause "was
designed for a common law world of limited government" and today
"would emasculate many desirable regulatory regimes."6
Professor Arcila is certainly not the first scholar to argue against
an orginalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. But, like
other commentators, Professor Arcila does not offer a plausible alternative to orginalist arguments. If we are not going to interpret the
Fourth Amendment based on text and history, then how should we interpret the Amendment?
II. THE DIFFERING APPROACHES TO PROBABLE CAUSE
Professor Arcila asserts that during the Framing era, American
lawyers endorsed two different approaches to probable cause and the
magistrate's role in the process of issuing warrants. Under the sentryship model, magistrates would review warrant applications by "aggressively inquiring into the merits of a probable cause assertion., 7 Under the ministerial model, the magistrate would "not engag[e] in
gate-keeping at all," but would only "oversee the production of a record for a later motion to suppress.""
Professor Arcila candidly notes that "in the treatises, the extent of
guidance suggesting a probable cause sentryship role for the judiciary
is impressive." 9 Professor Arcila then cites a long series of treatises
and cases-including many English sources-which state the probable cause requirement, and favor searching judicial review of warrants.1 l Professor Arcila acknowledges that these authorities "undeniably constitute an impressive litany of doctrinal evidence in favor of
judicial sentryship of probable cause.""
Professor Arcila then discusses other sources, which support a passive ministerial review of warrant applications. He focuses on American justice manuals from the Framing era-sources that previously
have received little attention in Fourth Amendment historical scholarship. Professor Arcila writes: "At least seven American justice
manuals from the Framers' era stated, in sections devoted to arrests,
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that it was convenient but not always necessary for judges to engage in
the probable cause sentryship role.' '
Professor Arcila also reviews search warrant forms, noting that
these forms often did not require that "the applicant ... affirm, in

general terms, that he had suspicion.' 3 Professor Arcila continues:
"The prevalence of legal forms that failed to demand the details underlying a probable cause claim is crucial because legal forms likely
dominated search warrant practice."" Professor Arcila asserts that
'justices of the peace reviewing these search warrant applications often lacked the necessary information to scrutinize probable cause,
unless they took the initiative to obtain it orally from the applicant
prior to issuing the requested warrant."05 Professor Arcila reaches
similar conclusions after reviewing "[a] plain text analysis of the secondary legal literature."1
Ultimately, Professor Arcila proves, quite convincingly, that the
search warrant application process was not uniform in early America,
but probably varied considerably. Other scholars also have noted a
lack of uniformity in Framing-era search and seizure law. In his review of Professor William Cuddihy's landmark treatise on Fourth
Amendment law, 17 Professor Morgan Cloud writes: "Search and seizure law was complex because law and practice were not uniform at
any point in time, at least after 1600. Inconsistent rules were applied
inconsistently in differing circumstances."'" Professor Cloud continues: "With almost humorous regularity, Cuddihy documents how victims and critics of general searches and seizures complained bitterly
and loudly, only to use the same methods against their adversaries
when they had the chance."' 9
Professor Arcila focuses on distinguishing between "elites of the
legal profession," who advocated 'judicial sentryship of probable
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Id. at 24. Professor Arcila acknowledges that all of these justice manuals addressed arrests, not searches. However, Professor Arcila continues: "I can discern no reason why
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cause," and "non-elite justices of the peace," who "may not have consistently acted as aggressive probable cause sentries prior to issuing
search warrants.

2 0°

But the historical record also suggests other dis-

tinctions in outlook and practice.
For example, the doctrine of unreasonable searches, warrants,
and probable cause developed primarily in early American port cities-particularly Boston. Even more than the current War on Drugs
dominates search and seizure doctrine, early American law enforcement focused on a single, specific crime-smuggling goods to avoid
paying customs duties. It is no coincidence that the 1761 litigation in
Paxton's case-the first significant American challenge to general
warrants-was brought by a group of Boston merchants.2 ' Nor is it
any coincidence that one of the most strident attacks on British general warrants was issued in 1772 by Samuel Adams, again in Boston.2
Differences between the northern and southern states indicate yet
another distinction in early search and seizure law. With few exceptions, northerners saw no value in mass searches pursuant to a general warrant requiring little justification. But in the South, such mass
searches still served a purpose. The general warrant remained a
valuable tool in the search for fugitive slaves.22
In short, the development of search and seizure law was not uniform in early America. Professor Arcila convincingly demonstrates
that warrant issuance is yet another aspect of search and seizure law
with considerable variance during the Framing era. This observation
is a significant contribution to Fourth Amendment historical research.
However, Professor Arcila uses these inconsistencies in Fourth
Amendment law as a springboard for a variety of other assertions. As
discussed below, I find several of Professor Arcila's suggestions problematic.
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Rights of the Colonists] (typically attributed to Samuel Adams).
As of 1787, five American states preserved the general warrant as a device for capturing
runaway slaves. See Cuddihy, supra note 17, at 1277-82; see also Cloud, supra note 18, at
1727-28.
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III. FRAMING-ERA MAGISTRATES, PROBABLE CAUSE, AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

A. Probable Cause and Shades of Gray
Throughout his article, Professor Arcila describes two types of
warrant review practiced by magistrates, contrasting the aggressive
warrant review of "sentryship" with a limited or non-existent probable
cause review, which Professor Arcila calls "ministerial. 2 4 Professor
Arcila strongly implies that most magistrates during the Framing era
practiced the lenient ministerial review, though he has no direct evidence to support this claim. As a result, Professor Arcila ends up
making highly qualified statements, such as the following: "[N]onelite justices of the peace often may not have consistently acted as aggressive probable cause sentries prior to issuing search warrants.'
Although Professor Arcila describes warrant review in the blackand-white terms of "sentryship" and "ministerial," in truth, review of
warrants probably often fell somewhere in the large gray area in between. Probable cause has always been a fact-specific and "fluid concept., 26 Further, as Professor Arcila himself recognizes, probable
cause standards have evolved over time.27 As recently as the 1983 decision in Illinois v. Gates,2 s the Supreme Court replaced the relatively
rigorous Aguilar-Spinelli approach to probable cause.29 In Gates, the
Court opted for a more flexible "totality-of-the-circumstances" probable cause test.30 Was the Gates Court signaling that magistrates
should adopt a "ministerial" approach when assessing warrants? To
the contrary, the Gates decision hoped that a relaxed standard would
encourage law enforcement officers to seek warrants more frequently.3 The new probable cause test in Gates may result in greater
magistrate involvement in reviewing search justifications, rather than
less involvement.
By describing the Framing-era warrant process as involving either
the rigorous review of sentryship decisions or the rubber-stamp review of ministerial decisions, Professor Arcila fails to recognize that
24
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Arcila, supra note 1, at 2.
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See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Gates, 462 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 237 (stating that a totality-of-the-circumstances test "better serves the purpose of
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most warrant review decisions probably fell in the considerable gray
area somewhere in between. As is true today, warrant applications
probably were rubber-stamped by some Framing-era magistratesparticularly those with limited education or legal training. At the
same time, warrant applications probably received intense scrutiny
from other magistrates-particularly those with legal training or
knowledge of recent innovations in search and seizure law. But most
plausibly, most evaluations of warrants probably fell somewhere in between.
Regardless of the warrant application review process conducted by
the majority of Framing-era magistrates, the clear trend was toward a
thorough review process. Professor Arcila acknowledges the "centuries of history that confronted justices of the peace in the Framers'
era, in which non-existent or low levels of suspicion had been sufficient to justify governmental intrusions. 3 2 In fact, the first court
opinion anywhere that rejected a warrant issued on less than probable
cause occurred in the English John Wilkes cases of the 1760s. 3 Given
both the long tradition of authorizing general warrants on flimsy suspicion, and the newness of the probable cause concept, one should
expect that some American magistrates continued to follow the "old
school" method of rubber-stamping warrants. Nonetheless, the very
adoption of the Fourth Amendment with its probable cause requirement demonstrated that the traditional acquiescence in unsupported
search warrants was a thing of the past, and that the new trend was
toward more aggressive review of warrants.
In short, many of Professor Arcila's arguments rely on his premise
that most early American magistrates performed a ministerial function by rubber-stamping warrants without a meaningful probable
cause review. Professor Arcila's premise does not adequately consider the Framing-era evolution in the role of the magistrate, away
from a ministerial function, and toward a meaningful inquiry into
probable cause.
B. Should IncorrectFourth Amendment InterpretationsMatter?
In support of his argument that Framing-era magistrates did not
carefully review warrant applications, Professor Arcila relies in part
32
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on statements in early American justice manuals. According to the
manuals, it was "convenient but not always necessary" for judges to
require probable cause before issuing a warrant. 34 While the justice
manuals contained such statements, the Fourth Amendment-and
the search and seizure provisions in early state constitutions-did
not.35 The Fourth Amendment was both clear and unequivocal about
whether probable cause was necessary prior to the issuance of a warrant. The Amendment provided that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause. 36 Early state declarations of rights typically
also permitted the issuance of a warrant only after a heightened evidentiary showing.

In providing that it was "convenient but not always necessary" for
judges to require probable cause before issuing a warrant, the American justice manuals incorrectly described early American constitutional law on search and seizure. To the extent that magistrates relied on these errant texts in issuing warrants, their decisions also were
wrong.
Professor Arcila seems to take the curious position that writings or
practice that misread the plain text of a constitutional provision are
relevant in interpreting that provision. Applying such an argument
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Arcila, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasis omitted).
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Amendment applied only to the federal government). During the Framing era, the federal government established very few crimes. See, e.g., NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY
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106 (1937) (observing that in the nineteenth century "the limited criminal jurisdiction of
the Federal Government was not exercised by Congress except in minor instances"). In
early America, most criminal law investigations and prosecutions were brought in the
state courts and governed by state law.
However, early state declarations of rights typically required some heightened evidentiary standard for the issuance of a warrant, similar to the probable cause requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,
VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 10, reprinted in 7
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3814 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (proscribing general warrants issued "without evidence of a fact committed"); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. X, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND
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first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them").
In short, a heightened evidentiary standard was required for warrants in both federal
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cases governed by the Fourth Amendment, and in state law cases governed by early state
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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outside the context of the Fourth Amendment would lead to some
truly curious results.
To understand the extreme implications of Professor Arcila's argument about the probable cause requirement, consider the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Plessy v. Ferguson,3 8 the Supreme Court held that the segregation of whites and
blacks in "separate but equal" facilities did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.3 9 As the Supreme Court later held in the landmark
Brown v. Board of Education decision, 4° the Equal Protection Clause interpretation in Plessy was simply wrong. Separate schools for white
and black students could never be equal, because of the stigma involved in excluding black students from a white school. As the Brown
Court noted in a famous passage about black students: "To separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone. 41
Yet Professor Arcila's approach would lead to serious questions
about the Brown decision. At the time of the Brown ruling, courts had
followed an unbroken practice of upholding "separate but equal"
treatment for more than fifty years since Plessy.42 Following Professor
Arcila's argument, the Brown Court should have given considerable
deference to this unbroken record, even though these decisions were
inconsistent with the original understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Returning to the Fourth Amendment, the plain language of the
Amendment proscribes the issuance of any warrant without probable
cause. When American justice manuals provided that a magistrate
need not require probable cause before issuing a warrant, the manuals were simply wrong. Any magistrates who issued warrants without
probable cause violated constitutional search and seizure provisions.
Even if Professor Arcila is correct that Framing-era magistrates typically issued warrants without assessing probable cause, it is not clear
why such unlawful decisions are relevant to an interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.
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163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Id. at 543-50.
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347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Id. at 494.
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but equal interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause for more than twenty years prior
to Plessy. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545, 548 (citing cases).
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IV. THE ABSENCE OF A REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT IN THE
FRAMING ERA

As Professor Arcila accurately observes, many Fourth Amendment
historical reviews assert that the Framers enacted the Fourth
Amendment either to impose a warrant preference rule or to impose
a reasonableness requirement. Professor Arcila ultimately sides with
scholars who favor a reasonableness requirement.
However, as my
earlier article in this Journal illustrates, neither the warrant preference
rule nor the reasonableness requirement is an accurate interpretation
of Fourth Amendment history.
Professor
Arcila
addresses
the
warrant
preference
rule/reasonableness requirement debate in the concluding section of
his article. Professor Arcila rejects the warrant preference rule because:
the probable cause protections that Warrant Clause adherents prefer,
which are grounded in aggressive judicial sentryship, appear at odds with
an historical understanding of probable cause, in which it is likely that
sentryship took an aggressive form only inconsistent! at best, and may
often have ranged from lax to essentially non-existent.

If a warrant preference rule did not provide protection from government searches and seizures, then certainly something in the
Fourth Amendment had to provide that protection. Professor Arcila
ultimately endorses arguments that the Fourth Amendment was intended to impose a global reasonableness requirement on all
searches and seizures.45
As I have stated previously in this Journal, the original Fourth
Amendment did not impose any warrant requirement in the vast majority of situations, with one very important exception-physical
searches of residences. The overwhelming majority of searches in
early America-both before and after the adoption of the Fourth
46
Amendment-were conducted without warrants.
Faced with this evidence, advocates of the warrant preference rule
respond with a handful of statutes that required warrants outside of
house searches. As I have previously noted in this Journal, a section
of the federal Collections Act required a specific warrant before cus-

43
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Arcila, supra note 1, at 6-8.
Id. at 59.
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Id. at 55-58.
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Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U. LJ. 1031, 1041-45 nn.64-65 (1986) (reviewing search and seizure statutes).
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toms agents could search buildings.47 Under a 1786 Rhode Island
law, federal tax agents needed to obtain a specific warrant before
searching a "Dwelling-House, Store, Ware-house, or other Building. ''48
And in a 1786 statute, Delaware required specific warrants when
searches of buildings sought cargo pilfered from shipwrecked vessels.49 While some scholars cite these statutes as evidence of an early
warrant preference rule, the statutes actually may undercut the warrant preference rule. Why did legislators need to enact a warrant requirement in statutes, if constitutional provisions already mandated
such a requirement? And if constitutional search and seizure provisions mandated a broad warrant preference rule, why did the early
statutes require a warrant in such narrow circumstances?
Although very little historical evidence supports a warrant preference rule, a global Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement
receives even less support from the historical evidence. Courts published fewer than fifty constitutional search and seizure cases before
1890. Based on this lack of decisions, early American lawyers and
judges probably did not view constitutional search and seizure provisions as imposing a global reasonableness requirement on all
searches and seizures. Further, in at least two ship seizure cases that
reached the Supreme Court during the early nineteenth century, neither the litigants nor the Justices even mentioned the Fourth
Amendment. 50 In an 1874 case involving a challenge to a state repossession statute, constitutional scholar and Michigan Supreme Court
Justice Thomas Cooley wrote that a Michigan constitutional provision
proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures was simply inapplicable. 5' In his landmark article discussing Fourth Amendment history,
Thomas Davies addresses Fourth Amendment reasonableness arguments accurately and succinctly, with a52section titled: "There Was No
Historical 'Reasonableness' Standard.'

Arguments that the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment
primarily to impose a global reasonableness requirement on all
searches face yet another impassable obstacle. If Fourth Amendment

47

Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43; see also Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of
the Fourth Amendment: A HistoricalReview, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 963 (1997) (noting that this

section of the Collection Act required a specific warrant).
48

Cuddihy, supra note 17, at 1292.
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Id. at 1293.
See The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362 (1824); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804).

51
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protection depended on reasonableness, and not warrants, then presumably some house searches could be reasonable, even if law enforcement officers had not obtained a prior valid warrant. Further, if
the Framers viewed warrants as unimportant, or even dangerous,
then warrantless house searches should have been completely lawful
during the Framing era.
Yet, as I have stated in my earlier article: "The Fourth Amendment proscribed physical trespasses into houses pursuant to a general
warrant, or no warrant at all." 3 While so many assertions about
Fourth Amendment history lack support, statements about the impropriety of house searches pursuant to a general warrant are everywhere. Consider just a few examples. In his 1644 English treatise, Sir
Edward Coke wrote: "One or more justice or justices of peace cannot
make a warrant upon a bare surmise to break any mans house to
search for a felon, or for stolen goods.' 4 In the 1763 English case of
Wilkes v. Wood,55 Chief Justice Pratt wrote that where law enforcement
officers claimed a right "to force persons houses, break open
escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a general warrant,"
these ac'6
tions were "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.'
Coke's treatise and the John Wilkes cases provided authority for
American opposition to house searches pursuant to writs of assistance-the American version of the general warrant. Speaking at a
Boston town meeting in 1772, Samuel Adams attacked the writs of assistance with the following language: "[O]ur homes and even our
bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests &
trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches... whenever
they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares etc.
for which the dutys have not been paid."'7 Similarly, in a 1774 address to the American people, the Continental Congress protested
against the power of customs officers "to break open and enter
houses without
the authority of any civil magistrate founded on legal
8
information."0

Given the opposition to house searches pursuant to general warrants, it is inconceivable that the Framers would permit house

53

Steinberg,supra note 2, at 605.
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OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:

CONCERNING THEJURISDICTION OF COURTS 176 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1644).
55
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See Davies, supra note 52, at 578 n.74.
WAilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
Id. at 498.
A State of the Rights of the Colonists, supranote 22, at 243.
Cuddihy, supra note 17, at 1116 (internal quotation omitted).
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searches without any warrant at all. A general warrant at least provided residents with some protection-albeit minimal protection. A
law enforcement officer needed to draft the warrant, and then present the general warrant to a magistrate for review and (virtually
automatic) approval. In contrast, warrantless house searches lacked
even these minimal protections, judged inadequate in the Framing
era. Once again, Thomas Davies summarizes the Framing-era law
simply and eloquently: "[T] he common law apparently provided no
justification for a search of9 a house beyond the ministerial execution
of a valid search warrant.",

In the end, Professor Arcila's argument for a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness regime seems based more on modern public policy
concerns than historical evidence. Professor Arcila writes: "We now
live in a nation with pervasive regulation, both statutory and regulatory, which permeates most aspects of our daily lives. To impose a
probable cause or prior suspicion requirement
in this context would
60
emasculate many desirable statutory regimes.
As a matter of public policy, I express no opinion on whether
regulating government searches and seizures through a reasonableness regime is more desirable than regulating such searches through
a regime based on warrants and probable cause. But as a matter of
Fourth Amendment history, Professor Arcila's work does not support
arguments for a Fourth Amendment global reasonableness requirement. Simply put, no historical evidence suggests that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to impose such a requirement.
V. WHY HISTORY MATTERS

At the end of his piece, Professor Arcila concludes that historical
evidence should be largely irrelevant to modern understandings of
the Fourth Amendment. After noting the very limited reach of government during the Framing era, Professor Arcila writes: "Emphasizing probable cause or suspicion for the most part worked well in this
context."6' Professor Arcila continues: "We now live in a nation with
pervasive regulation, both statutory and regulatory, which permeates
most aspects of our daily lives. To impose a probable cause or prior

59
60

Davies, supranote 52, at 649.
Arcila, supra note 1, at 59.

61

Id.
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suspicion requirement 6in
this context would emasculate many desir2
able statutory regimes.
Initially, Professor Arcila's conclusion seems hard to understand,
given the focus of his article. Professor Arcila has written a carefully
researched and detailed discussion of search and seizure law in the
Framing era, only to conclude that such history should be irrelevant.
As one reviews Professor Arcila's historical observations more
carefully, his conclusion is easier to understand. Having reviewed the
historical evidence, Professor Arcila has found that the standards and
practices were inconsistent and varied in early America. Scholars may
be unable to identify a single "original understanding" on particular
search and seizure issues, such as the standard for issuing warrants.
This leads to an initial argument for rejecting Fourth Amendment
originalism-that any original understanding of the Amendment is
impossible to identify. Having found evidence to support this first
argument, Professor Arcila incorporates a second argument-even if
someone could identify the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, that original understanding would be inconsequential,
because times have changed.
As noted in my article previously published in this Journal, Professor Arcila certainly is not the first scholar to argue that modern
Fourth Amendment doctrine should not look to the original understanding of the Amendment. Some scholars argue that evidence on
the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment is too vague
and ambiguous to provide modern courts with any guidance. 6 Like
Professor Arcila, others contend that even if one could ascertain the
original understanding of the Amendment with clarity, changing
times have made that understanding obsolete.6 4

62

Id.

63

See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 18 (noting that the complexity of the Fourth Amendment de-

fies simplistic generalizations asserted by the legal profession); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping
Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged,82 B.U.
L. REV. 895, 973 (2002) (concluding that the history of the Fourth Amendment presents,
at best, an incomplete picture of the Framers' intentions).
64

See, e.g., Davies, supra note 52, at 551-52 (arguing that the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment has necessarily changed over time); Yale Kamisar, The Writings ofJohn Barker
Waite and Thomas Davies on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1821,

1865 (2002) (noting Davies's explanation of why and how the passage of time has undermined the relevance of Fourth Amendment originalism); Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994) (asserting that interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause should accommodate purposes more general than the Framers' intent).
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However, the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment is
not as vague as some scholars suggest. As I have written in this Journal and elsewhere, Framing-era discussions of unreasonable searches
and seizures focused almost exclusively on a single issue-proscribing
house searches pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at all. 65
Contrary to current doctrine, I have argued that the Fourth Amendment should only regulate house searches.66
Most criticisms of Fourth Amendment originalism suffer from a
further limitation-a failure to offer specific alternatives to an orignalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Little consensus exists on most current search and seizure issues-other
•61 than the impropriety of warrantless physical entries into residences.
Professor Arcila expresses a clear preference for a Fourth
Amendment interpretation that emphasizes reasonableness, rather
than warrants and probable cause. 6 However, over the past forty
years, the Supreme Court has based the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement on the concept of reasonableness. The results of that
body of law are not encouraging.
In Katz v. United States,69 the Supreme Court rejected authority dat-

ing back to the Framing era, which held that the Fourth Amendment
required a warrant only when police trespassed into a protected area.
Despite Justice Hugo Black's dissenting argument that the Court improperly ignored the historical foundations of this trespass rule,70 the
Katz majority concluded that the reach of the Fourth Amendment
"cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure. '7t Instead, the Court determined that law
enforcement officers must obtain a warrant
if a person has exhibited
72
a "reasonable expectation of privacy.

65

66

See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 21, at 1061-82 (examining the historical record, and concluding that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to only prohibit unlawful
physical entries of residences).
See David E. Steinberg, Restoring the FourthAmendment: The Original UnderstandingRevisited,
33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 81-82 (2005).

67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 70-74 (examining the continuing divisions within the Supreme Court on Fourth
Amendment issues).
See Arcila, supra note 1, at 58-59.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 364-74.
Id. at 353.
The warrant test subsequently applied by the Court actually appears in Justice John
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz- The complete test reads: "My understanding of the
rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
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Subsequent applications of this reasonable expectation of privacy
test have not produced consistent or coherent results. For example,
Katz held that a warrantless wiretap of a public phone violated the
Fourth Amendment. 73 But in United States v. White,74 the Court upheld
the warrantless use of an informant with a radio transmitter, even
though some of the incriminating conversations took place in the defendant's home. 75 In Kyllo v. United States, 76 the Court held that the

warrantless use of a thermal imaging unit to measure the heat ema77
nating from a suspect's residence violated the Fourth Amendment.
But in Californiav. Ciraolo,78 the Court upheld the warrantless use of
an airplane to view marijuana plants in the defendant's backyard. 79
And so on.
The seemingly arbitrary nature of these cases not only is troubling
as a matter of judicial review, but also raises serious institutional concerns. If Fourth Amendment law is nothing more than the ad hoc
regulation of government searches and seizures, perhaps such regulation should come from elected legislators, rather than appointed justices. Legislators are popularly elected and have greater access to information through hearings and informal contacts. Also, undesirable
legislation can easily be repealed."'
Professor Arcila does not assert that reasonableness should be the
standard for requiring warrants. Instead, Professor Arcila proposes
that a focus on the reasonableness of a search should replace warrants as the means of regulating searches under the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, the Court's experience in Fourth Amendment
warrant clause decisions raises considerable questions about the viability of a Fourth Amendment regime built on the concept of reasonableness. Indeed, given the lack of consensus about the propriety
of most search techniques, considerable doubts remain about any

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at
361 (Harlanj., concurring).
Id. at 347.
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
Id. at 748-54.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 33-41.
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
Id. at 211-15.
For further discussion of this institutional argument, see generally Orin S. Kerr, The
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Casefor Caution, 102
MICH. L. REv. 801 (2004), and David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 465 (2007).
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Fourth Amendment regime that is divorced from the original understanding of the Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION

Having reread this response, I worry that I have been too critical
of Professor Arcila. Without question, Professor Arcila's article is an
important contribution to Fourth Amendment historical literature.
Professor Arcila provides important new insights on the Framing-era
magistrate's role in issuing warrants. Some Framing-era magistrates
probably reviewed warrant applications aggressively for probable
cause, while others probably rubber-stamped warrant applications. In
documenting early American practices, Professor Arcila relies on
sources such as the Framing-era justice manuals, which have received
too little attention in prior discussions of Fourth Amendment history.
All of this makes Professor Arcila's article a high quality and genuinely important work of legal scholarship.
Yet in the end, I worry that Professor Arcila's historical conclusions have been colored by his own preferences for Fourth Amendment reform. In particular, Professor Arcila contends that ministerial
rubber-stamping of warrant applications was probably more common
than aggressive sentryship review of these applications. This claim is
nothing more than pure speculation, supported by no solid historical
evidence.
However, this unsupported claim is important to Professor Arcila's
program for the modern Fourth Amendment. Warrants and probable
cause have been a central feature of much Fourth Amendment historical scholarship. If such accounts have been incorrect, then
Fourth Amendment history apparently is hopelessly vague. This
vagueness would support Professor Arcila's proposal that modern
analysis should ignore Framing-era discussions of unreasonable
searches and seizures. More importantly, if probable cause and warrants were not an important Framing-era restriction on searches and
seizures, this evidence would support Professor Arcila's desire that
modern Fourth Amendment analysis should emphasize reasonableness, not warrants and probable cause.
It is tempting to view the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment through the lens of modern conceptions and misconceptions about the Amendment. It is also misleading.
The Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment with one purposeto proscribe searches of houses pursuant to a general warrant, or no
warrant at all. Whether or not the Fourth Amendment should be
similarly limited today is a topic worthy of discussion. But before we
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decide on the importance of history in Fourth Amendment analysis,
we must first come to an unbiased, candid understanding of that history.

